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A human being ... is a part of the whole, called by us “Universe,”
a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his
thoughts and feelings as something separated from the rest—a
kind of optical delusion of his consciousness.1
INTRODUCTION
Before it is seen as a legitimate right, cognitive liberty will cease
to exist.2 In June 2008, India became the first country in the world
to convict a criminal defendant of murder on the basis of a brain
scan indicating that the defendant, Aditi Sharma, had “experiential
knowledge,” or memory, of the murder in question.3 The brain scan
convinced the court that Sharma possessed a specific memory of
murdering her fiancé, “as opposed to ... [merely] hearing the details
of his murder from another person.”4 Sharma, who consented to the
1. Walter Sullivan, The Einstein Papers: A Man of Many Parts Was Long Involved in the
Cause of Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1972, at 1. 
2. Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand: How Neuroscience Is Transforming the Legal
System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11
Neurolaw.t.html. Skeptics of neuroscience’s entry into the courtroom claim that “the use of
brain-scanning technology as a kind of super mind-reading device will threaten our privacy
and mental freedom, leading some to call for the legal system to respond with a new concept
of ‘cognitive liberty.’” Id. 
3. See Anand Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts Is Debated, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 14, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/world/asia/15brainscan.html. The
machine used, an electroencephalogram (EEG), measures the brain’s electrical waves. Id.
(“The suspect sits in silence, eyes shut. An investigator reads aloud details of the crime—as
prosecutors see it—and the resulting brain images are processed.”). The brain “lights up in
specific regions” in response to the reading if the individual is reliving the experiences. Id.
(noting that Champadi Raman Mukundan developed India’s version of this test, called the
Brain Electrical Oscillations Signature test (BEOS), based upon American neuroscientist
Lawrence Farwell’s work on brain fingerprinting). The Indian court used the BEOS as the
basis upon which to convict Sharma of murder. Id. A few months after Sharma’s conviction,
India’s National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences released a statement declaring
brain scans too unscientific for use against criminal defendants in court. Angela Saini, The
Brain Police: Judging Murder with an MRI, WIRED.CO.UK (May 27, 2009), http://www.wired.
co.uk/magazine/archive/2009/06/features/guilty. Sharma appealed on this basis, and in 2009
the court released her on bail pending her appeal, which might take between five and ten
years to occur due to “India’s slow judicial process.” Id. 
4. Brian Farrell, Can’t Get You Out of My Head: The Human Rights Implications of
Using Brain Scans as Criminal Evidence, 4 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 89, 89 (2009-2010)
(citing Saini, supra note 3).
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test, sat in a room wearing a “skullcap” with thirty wires hooked to
it that measured her brain activity in response to the following tape-
recorded statements pertaining to her relationship with her fiancé:
“I had an affair with Udit .... I got arsenic from the shop. I called
Udit. I gave him the sweets mixed with arsenic. The sweets killed
Udit.”5 The test—an EEG—showed Sharma’s brain lighting up in
various colors during the reading of these statements, allegedly
proving her culpability by indicating specific knowledge of her
fiancé’s murder.6 
Within six months of Sharma’s conviction, an Indian court used
the same testing to find two more criminal defendants guilty of
murder based on “conclusive” findings of experiential knowledge.7
The Indian court’s decision not only to use neuroscientific evidence
in the courtroom but also to employ it as a basis upon which to
convict criminal defendants of murder sent shock waves throughout
the scientific and legal communities.8 The court’s decision prompted
substantial debate as to whether reliance on this evidence was
appropriate, with an overwhelming majority of commentators be-
lieving that without more proof of the technology’s reliability, the
court’s willingness to rely on it was unsoundly premature.9 
Although the United States has yet to admit evidence of brain
scans in either civil or criminal proceedings for lie-detection pur-
poses, scholars suggest that a courtroom display, in which a defen-
dant is connected to electrodes and has his brain scan projected
onto a screen for the jury to assess his truth-telling capacity and
5. Saini, supra note 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. Id.
7. See id. (declaring that, in the wake of this string of convictions, “[n]euroimaging as
truth teller had come of age”).
8. See Giridharadas, supra note 3.
9. Id. (noting that Henry Greely, a bioethicist at Stanford Law School, found the court’s
decision to be “both interesting and disturbing”). Greely described this technology as “a magic
... solution to lie detection.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Maybe we’ll have it
someday, but we need to demand the highest standards of proof before we ruin people’s lives
based on its application.”). Dr. Rosenfeld, a psychologist and neuroscientist at Northwestern
University, expressed a similar sentiment, noting that “[t]echnologies which are neither
seriously peer-reviewed nor independently replicated are not ... credible .... The fact that an
advanced and sophisticated democratic society such as India would actually convict persons
based on an unproven technology is even more incredible.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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experiential knowledge of an event, is not far from occurring.10
American neuroscientist Michael Gazzinga has gone so far as to
predict that this new technology will eventually “dominate the
entire legal system.”11
Although Gazzinga’s theorized domination has yet to occur
domestically, other countries have shown interest in experimenting
with neuroscience.12 Both Israel and Singapore, for instance, have
commenced research on the possible uses of neuroscientific evi-
dence.13 Moreover, in May 2009, an Italian court of appeals became
the first European court to use genetic information and brain-
imaging scans to reduce a criminal defendant’s murder sentence,
finding that the evidence indicated an unavoidable propensity
toward violence.14 
The ever-widening international scope of neuroscientific research
is unsurprising. The prospect of using science to analyze the
“criminal mind,” including the histories and motivations of crimi-
nals, has obvious allure.15 Individuals have “looked to inheritance
(genetics), anatomical features (phrenology), a history of emotional
trauma or unresolved psychic conflict (psychoanalysis), or socioeco-
nomic deprivation (sociology and economics) to explain why some
10. See generally Michael Haederle, A Mind of Crime, MILLER-MCCUNE (Feb. 23, 2010),
http://www.miller-mccune.com/legal-affairs/a-mind-of-crime-8440/ (noting that in one case,
counsel used an alleged murderer’s projected brain scans, marked with “X’s” to indicate
problems in brain functioning, to assist the jury in its determination of guilt); Ed Yong,
Controversy of Brain Scan Use in Courtrooms, CBS NEWS (May 10, 2010, 4:53 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/10/tech/main6471186.shtml (commenting on the
irony of this courtroom display, as it facilitates a betrayal of oneself through one’s own
memories).
11. Michael Cook, Liar, Liar, Brain on Fire!, MERCATORNET (June 17, 2010),
http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/liar_liar_brain_on_fire/ (internal quotation marks
omitted). Similarly, some scholars postulate that the usefulness of neuroscientific evidence
to the legal community is analogous to that of DNA. See, e.g., Giridharadas, supra note 3.
12. See Giridharadas, supra note 3.
13. See id.
14. See Emiliano Feresin, Lighter Sentence for Murderer with ‘Bad Genes,’ NATURE NEWS
(Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091030/full/news.2009.1050.html?s=
news_rss (“On the basis of the genetic tests, Judge Reinotti docked a further year off the
defendant’s sentence, arguing that the defendant's genes ‘would make him particularly
aggressive in stressful situations.’”).
15. See Laura S. Khoshbin & Shahram Khoshbin, Imaging the Mind, Minding the Image:
An Historical Introduction to Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 171, 183 (2007)
(noting that principles of deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution have largely driven this
quest for knowledge).
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commit crimes and others do not.”16 In future years, however, people
will likely turn to neuroscience to provide these answers.17 
Legal scholars fall on opposite ends of the continuum regarding
the ultimate utility of this evidence in the courtroom.18 Some argue
that its accuracy and reliability are intact and pose few problems to
admittance.19 Others, such as John G. New, Professor of Biology at
Loyola University of Chicago, contend that, even assuming its
eventual scientific reliability, significant evidentiary and constitu-
tional issues are at stake in using this evidence in either civil or
criminal proceedings.20 Still others believe that a greater under-
standing of potential legal uses of neuroscientific evidence, in
conjunction with a sound regulatory scheme, would prove beneficial
to the legal arena.21 
Regardless of one’s position in this burgeoning debate, however,
the ethical and human rights considerations at stake are difficult to
ignore. Technology that is able to detect what a person is thinking
could signal the end of mental privacy, particularly if such testing
were to become mandatory. In essence, subconscious thoughts would
no longer be our own.22 As Joshua Greene noted, 
16. Id.
17. See id. at 183-84.
18. See Joelle A. Moreno, The Future of Neuroimaged Lie Detection and the Law, 42
AKRON L. REV. 717, 725-26 (2009).
19. See Rosen, supra note 2.
20. See John G. New, If You Could Read My Mind: Implications of Neurological Evidence
for Twenty-First Century Criminal Jurisprudence, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 179, 188, 191-98 (2008);
see also Rosen, supra note 2. Stephen Morse, Professor of Psychology at the University of
Pennsylvania, believes that neuroscientific evidence should not be used to determine criminal
responsibility or punishment. Stephanie J. Bird & Judy Illes, Neuroethics: A Modern Context
for Ethics in Neuroscience, 29 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCE 511, 514 (2006). According to Morse, the
“colorful images of the brain such as those produced by functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) might blind people to the fundamental legal assumption that ‘people are
conscious, intentional and potentially rational agents’ and therefore responsible for their
actions.” Id.
21. Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide to the Perplexed,
2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 6 (“We are concerned that brain imaging can be misused by
lawyers ... and misunderstood by judges and jurors. Consequently, our aim ... is to provide
information about ... brain imaging techniques, in hopes that it will increase the extent to
which imaging is properly interpreted, and ... decrease the extent to which it is misunderstood
or misused.”). 
22. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1. This technology has the ability to thrust Albert
Einstein’s “optical delusion” of consciousness into a nonillusory, nondelusional reality—a
reality that would seek to expose that which is most private and most sacred: one’s thoughts,
feelings, and memories. Assuming that science, and neuroscience in particular, might seek
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to a neuroscientist, you are your brain; nothing causes your
behavior other than the operations of your brain .... If that’s
right, it radically changes the way we think about the law. The
official line in the law is all that matters is whether you’re
rational, but you can have someone who is totally rational but
whose strings are being pulled by something beyond his
control.23 
Implications of this technology extend beyond evidentiary and
constitutional concerns and delve into a new field that scholars have
branded “neuroethics.”24
In analyzing the current forms of neuroscientific technology that
researchers suggest will soon impact the legal community, this Note
addresses the history of neuroscience use in the courtroom—in the
United States as well as internationally—and the future conse-
quences of its admissibility in court. Part I provides a brief history
of neuroscience in the courtroom, including an examination of the
two forms of neuroscientific technology currently employed as lie
detectors; an overview of courts that have admitted various forms
of neuroscience evidence; and a brief synopsis of current attempts
to admit this new evidence in court—both nationally and interna-
tionally. 
Part II explores ways in which scholars have analogized neurosci-
ence to other forms of scientific inquiry, such as DNA and finger-
printing evidence, while noting the inherent differences between
past technology and neuroscience and the dangers of drawing too
close an analogy. Part II also addresses the growing international
attention paid to neuroscience and its application to the law abroad. 
to achieve this exposure, the law, as the ultimate arbiter, would be forced to intervene.
23. Rosen, supra note 2. Greene, an Assistant Psychology Professor at Harvard
University, provides an example of someone choosing between soup and salad. Id. According
to Greene, although it may appear to be a rational choice, neuroscientific evidence indicates
that such a simple decision may be “ultimately predestined by forces hard-wired in his brain,”
making the notion of rational choice merely illusory. Id.
24. See Bird & Illes, supra note 20, at 511. In 2002, the Dana Foundation held a meeting
entitled “Neuroethics: Mapping the Field,” during which scholars solidified the concept of
neuroethics and analyzed, among several factors, “the implications of neuroscience for notions
of the self, agency and responsibility.” Id. at 512, 514; Tamami Fukushi et al., Ethical
Considerations of Neuroscience Research: The Perspectives on Neuroethics in Japan, 57
NEUROSCIENCE RES. 10, 10 (2007). 
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Part III addresses the field of neuroethics, arguing that neuro-
ethics, as an extension of bioethics, should fall under the aus-
pices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization’s (UNESCO) Universal Declaration of Bioethics and
Human Rights, as well as the fair trial and privacy provisions in
both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European
Human Rights Convention. Ultimately, this Note maintains that
although this technology, if proven reliable, would provide beneficial
information to court proceedings, the cost to an individual’s right to
cognitive liberty is too great not to heavily scrutinize this technology
through the lens of human rights protections. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEUROSCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
As George Orwell postulated in his dystopian novel, Nineteen
Eighty-Four, “[t]houghtcrime was not a thing that could be con-
cealed forever. You might dodge successfully for a while, even for
years, but sooner or later they were bound to get you.”25 Although
the Orwellian concept has yet to become a full-fledged reality,
neuroscientific evidence and its rapid growth has seemingly limit-
less possibilities, leaving many to propound that this technology has
the ability to become the ultimate lie detector.26 
Both legal and scientific scholars scrutinize the use of this new
technology in the context of the burgeoning field of neurolaw—a
field that examines the interdisciplinary link between neuroscience
and the law.27 Scholars argue that the legal community is reluctant
25. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 20 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1949).
26. See Bird & Illes, supra note 20, at 515 (noting that the pursuit of “a method for
detecting deception has been an enduring focus of scientific endeavor in the neurobehavioral
sciences ... [and] is likely to be rapid”); Sean K. Thompson, The Legality of the Use of
Psychiatric Neuroimaging in Intelligence Interrogation, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1601, 1602 (2005)
(“FMRI could function as a hyper-accurate lie detector.”).
27. See George J. Annas, Imagining a New Era of Neuroimaging, Neuroethics, and
Neurolaw, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 163, 163 (2007) (“As with contemporary medicolegal and
bioethical literature on the implications of genetic engineering and nanotechnology, there is
much imagination, hype, and even science fiction in this new arena, dubbed ‘neurolaw.’”).
Others, however, are avid proponents of this new field. See Rosen, supra note 2. One such
supporter is Owen Jones, Professor of Law and Biology at Vanderbilt University and one of
the leading proponents for Vanderbilt’s $27 million MacArthur Foundation grant to help fund
a neuroimaging center and the “nation’s first program in law and neuroscience.” Id. Jones has
referred to neurolaw as 
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to expand its focus past the social sciences, and as a result, “legal
thinkers have generally ignored an array of interdisciplinary
approaches that are rapidly changing the way we understand how
the mind works and what it means to be human.”28 This reluctance
thus impedes what some hold to be the law’s basic function: the
consumption and application of knowledge from other disciplines.29
When the process of scientific consumption and application does
occur, however, it is fraught with misunderstandings and improper
uses of science by “judges, legislators, agency personnel, and other
policymakers,” a reality that underscores the necessity of proper
communication between the disciplines.30 Even a proper under-
standing of the science, however, does not mean that the science
should be permitted to function in the legal arena without a proper
regulatory scheme in place. 
A. The Two-Fold Science of Lie Detection
There are two primary forms of neuroscientific evidence that
operate, in some capacity, as lie-detection devices: (1) functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging, or fMRI, which Daniel Langleben of
the University of Pennsylvania applied to his “Guilty Knowledge”
test in 2001,31 finding that particular areas of the brain light up
the new frontier in law and science—we’re peering into the black box to see how
the brain is actually working, that hidden place in the dark quiet, where we
have our private thoughts and private reactions—and the law will inevitably
have to decide how to deal with this new technology. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 405, 408 (2005).
29. Id. at 411.
30. See id. at 419-20.
31. Rosen, supra note 2. fMRI provides images of the brain in action, displaying what the
person is thinking by providing “near-real time, ultra-high resolution, computer-generated
models of brain activity.” Thompson, supra note 26, at 1602. Researchers have further noted
that 
[t]he development of fMRI as a cognitive, as opposed to simply diagnostic, tool
promises to bring fresh controversy and challenges to the use of scientific
evidence in the courtroom. Several studies employing fMRI to detect the
truthfulness or deceit of a subject have recently been conducted and suggest that
it may be possible to discern by MRI whether an individual is being truthful. If
such studies prove reliable, they may be the next generation of “lie detector”
employed to establish the truthfulness of a defendant or the credibility of a
witness.
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when people lie;32 and (2) brain fingerprinting, developed by
Lawrence Farwell, which measures frequency changes of brain
waves upon recognition of “images, pictures, sights, and smells.”33 
Studies of fMRI brain scans reveal potentially high success rates
for truth-telling detection,34 as well as for determining specific mem-
ories of events and people.35 When a person sees a familiar face or
hears a recapitulation of an event in which he took part, the
hippocampus—the part of the brain that regulates “memory and
parts of the visual cortex”—experiences heightened activity.36 This
evidence, therefore, can make it difficult or even impossible for a
person to conceal or refute knowledge of a particular individual or
event.37 Scientists postulate that this evidence might make it
possible to ascertain how people feel about one another38 and to
“essentially read minds” within fifty years.39
Researchers conducting these brain scans operate under the as-
sumption that “deception involves multiple cognitive processes that
are superimposed upon a truth-telling baseline.”40 When someone
is lying, he simultaneously “withhold[s] the truth (suppression veri)
while constructing a consistent new item of information (suggestio
falsi).”41 The baseline, therefore, is either the truth or a lie that
New, supra note 20, at 181 (citations omitted).  
32. Rosen, supra note 2 (noting that certain areas of subjects’ brains lit up when they were
instructed to lie in response to questions that researchers asked them about playing cards). 
33. Id.
34. See Thompson, supra note 26, at 1608-09. fMRI evidence has also been used in
counterterrorism efforts, and certain proponents, particularly those at the University of
Pennsylvania’s Institute for Strategic Analysis and Response (ISTAR), believe that this
evidence will significantly decrease the torture involved in obtaining information from
terrorists. Id. at 1602, 1609-11. For example, an interrogator using this evidence against a
detainee could show the detainee “pictures of suspected terrorists, or of potential terrorist
targets, which would generate certain neural responses if the detainee were familiar with the
subjects pictured.” Id. at 1602.
35. See id. at 1610.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See id. (noting that some researchers think they have isolated “brain regions
associated with love”). 
39. Id. (citations omitted) (“In a recent study, scientists using a new, higher-resolution
form of fMRI were able to determine what subjects were looking at, even when the subjects
themselves were not consciously aware of what they were seeing.”).
40. New, supra note 20, at 181.
41. Id.
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requires a minimal amount of cognitive energy.42 Deception requires
a greater degree of cognition, and often more complex cognition,
than does telling the truth.43 The fMRI then detects this heightened
degree of deceptive activity.44 
The tantalizing nature of this “mind-reading” fMRI technology
has created both widespread fascination and contentious commen-
tary from legal scholars and lay individuals alike.45 In fact, despite
the relative novelty of this technology, two competing American
companies are already working to solidify their place in the nascent
fMRI market.46 No Lie fMRI and Cephos are attempting to perfect
fMRI technology for use in the government sector and the court-
room.47 According to Steven Laken, Cephos’s president, “two to three
people ... call every single week ... [who are] in legal proceedings
throughout the world, and [are] ... looking to bolster their credibil-
ity.”48 
Brain fingerprinting, the second form of lie detection, searches for
specific information in a person’s memory based on electrical brain
activity.49 Although this methodology is currently unable to decode
specific memories relating to a person or an event, there is a high
probability  that, in time, “lie detectors in the courtroom will be-
come much more accurate, and correspondingly more intrusive.”50
Lawrence Farwell, the creator of brain fingerprinting, insists that
the technology “does not prove guilt or innocence .... [Rather,] [t]hat
is the role of a judge and jury.”51 According to Farwell, however,
brain fingerprinting is capable of providing information on whether
42. See id.
43. See id. (noting that lying activates several “executive functions such as problem
solving, planning, and the conscious manipulation of information in working memory”). 
44. Id. at 180-81. When telling the truth, the executive brain functions and centers
—including the anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortices—should display a lesser degree of
activity than when telling a lie. Id. at 181-82. 
45. See Moreno, supra note 18, at 734-37. Studies on people’s reactions to the field of
neuroscience indicate that “brain scan images are incredibly appealing, even to sophisticated
audiences.” Id. at 737. 
46. See Rosen, supra note 2.
47. See id. Cephos charges $4000 per test. Moreno, supra note 18, at 724 n.30. 
48. See Rosen, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Id. (noting that brain fingerprinting can measure a brain wave, which “changes its
frequency when people recognize images, pictures, sights and smells”).
50. Id.
51. A New Paradigm in Criminal Justice, BRAIN FINGERPRINTING LABORATORIES,
http://www.brainwavescience.com/criminal-justice.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
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a defendant has a stored memory of the crime in question within his
brain.52 
Brain fingerprinting is made possible by the P300 wave—a brain
wave that becomes activated when an individual recognizes some-
one or something that is part of his specific memory.53 For example,
when presented with a crime scene photograph or piece of evidence,
a guilty person’s P300 wave should become activated, whereas an
innocent person would fail to recognize the item and thus produce
no P300 wave.54 This technology, however, is not currently capable
of providing information as to the specific content of an individual’s
memory.55 As such, it would be possible to wrongly incriminate an
innocent person with knowledge of a victim or an event unconnected
to the crime at issue—a possibility that poses serious legal concerns
about this technology’s use.56 
The rise of and fascination with neuroscientific technology is
pronounced and ever-expanding, with approximately 8,700 pub-
lished articles on fMRI and related topics between 1991 and 2007.57
Neuroscience has had an equally significant impact on the general
public through mainstream media.58 Some scholars believe that
what neuroscience promises—a glimpse into what and how we think
—combined with the misguided perception that this is “legitimate
‘hard’ science because researchers rely on technologically sophisti-
cated neuroimaging tools of demonstrated accuracy,” will lead courts
to subject this field to less intense scrutiny and skepticism than
courts have afforded other “soft sciences” in the past.59 
B. Past Uses of Neuroscience in the Law
Although neurolaw is a relatively new field, courts have relied on
neuroscience to assess behavior in civil and criminal trials for
decades, using the commonly known forms of EEGs, PET scans, and
52. Id.
53. New, supra note 20, at 185-86.
54. Id. at 186.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 187, 192.
57. Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for
Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 379-80 (2007).
58. Moreno, supra note 18, at 720-21.
59. Id. at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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MRIs.60 For example, in 1981, during John Hinckley’s trial for the
attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan, the court
admitted CT scans intended to show evidence of Hinckley’s schizo-
phrenia.61 The expert witness testified that the scans, although
abnormal, did not conclusively prove that Hinckley’s actions were
the result of his brain abnormalities.62 Regardless of the psychia-
trist’s testimony, the jury rendered a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity, leading to the natural inference that the CT evidence
was a primary, if not the primary, determining factor in the jury’s
verdict.63 
More recently, in 2007, a court sentenced Peter Braunstein, a
New York journalist, to prison for eighteen years to life for kidnap-
ping, sexual abuse, and robbery.64 The defense’s principal argument
was that Braunstein’s schizophrenia prevented him from controlling
his violent impulses, a theory that the defense attempted to prove
through MRI evidence.65 Furthermore, in both People v. Weinstein
and McNamara v. Borg, the defense introduced evidence of PET
scans during the murder trials to provide behavioral explanations
for the defendants’ actions.66 The defense in Weinstein credited a
brain cyst as the underlying reason the defendant murdered his
60. See id. at 719-20 (discussing the three common forms of measuring brain activity); see
also Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 15, at 184-86 (discussing the past uses and continued
evolution of neuroimaging devices).
61. See Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 15, at 184.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Anemona Hartocollis, Writer Sentenced for Sexually Tormenting Former Colleague,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/19/nyregion/19fake.html.
65. Moreno, supra note 18, at 723. (“The jury viewed Braustein's MRI scans and heard
defense arguments linking Braustein's schizophrenia to his inability to control his violent
impulses. This jury presumably considered the possibility that brain scans might provide
reasonable doubt that Braustein had formulated the requisite intent to harm this victim.
However, they were not convinced and the defendant was convicted on all counts. The
Braustein case, because it involved MRI evidence to explain the defendant's actions, is
representative of the type of behavior-related neuroscience evidence that is increasingly likely
to be proffered and admitted in both criminal and civil trials.”).
66. McNamara v. Borg, 923 F.2d 862, 862 (9th Cir. 1991); People v. Weinstein, 591
N.Y.S.2d 715, 722-24 (Sup. Ct. 1992); Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 15, at 184-85 &
nn.99, 106 & 111 (citing An Overview of the Impact of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal
Law (Sept. 2004) (staff working paper discussed at the 2004 meeting of the President’s
Council on Bioethics) [hereinafter Neuroscience Evidence], available at http://bioethics.
georgetown.edu/pcbe/background/neuroscience_evidence.html).
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wife.67 Although the defense did not ultimately admit the evidence
because the defendant accepted a plea bargain, some speculated
that the plea bargain was the result of the prosecution’s belief that
“the jury would be unduly persuaded by the scans.”68 In McNamara,
however, the court admitted evidence of PET scans, which the
defense used to show that the defendant suffered from schizophre-
nia.69 After the jury rendered its verdict of life in prison, a few jurors
admitted that the scans “persuaded them to grant leniency” in the
form of life in prison as opposed to the death penalty.70 All of these
cases demonstrate that the use of neurological evidence in court
tends to impact the outcomes of criminal cases.
C. Recent Attempts to Admit Brain Scan Evidence in Court
Whereas the aforementioned uses of neuroscience have been
largely accepted as reliable methods of behavioral analysis,71 the
projected uses of neuroscience in the courtroom discussed in this
Note, such as brain fingerprinting, go beyond behavioral analysis in
the commonly and historically recognized sense. Largely due to the
belief that this science will pose significant evidentiary and consti-
tutional problems to admissibility,72 U.S. courts have been reluctant
to admit cognitive neuroscience evidence for the purposes of lie
detection and memory exploration.73 Instances in which U.S. courts
have excluded newer variants of neuroscientific evidence are dis-
cussed below.
To date, U.S. courts have considered only two attempts to admit
fMRI evidence for truth-telling purposes.74 Both courts ultimately
excluded the evidence during the pretrial hearing, but they did so
67. Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 15, at 184-85 (citations omitted). 
68. Neuroscience Evidence, supra note 66.
69. McNamara, 923 F.2d at 862. 
70. Neuroscience Evidence, supra note 66.
71. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
72. New, supra note 20, at 191-92, 194-95, 197-98.
73. Moreno, supra note 18, at 723.
74. See Alexis Madrigal, Brain Scan Lie-Detection Deemed Far from Ready for Courtroom,
WIRED (June 1, 2010, 3:20 PM), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2010/06/fmri-lie-detection-
in-court/ [hereinafter Madrigal, Brain Scan]; Alexis Madrigal, Judge Issues Legal Opinion in
Brooklyn fMRI Case, WIRED (May 17, 2010, 8:36 PM), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/
2010/05/brooklyn-fmri-case/ [hereinafter Madrigal, Brooklyn fMRI Case].
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on different grounds.75 In United States v. Semrau, which a federal
court in Tennessee decided in May 2010, the judge excluded fMRI
evidence that the defendant attempted to admit to prove that he had
not defrauded the government.76 After watching a fifty-three slide
presentation and listening to numerous reports submitted by Steven
Laken, Cephos’s president, on peer-reviewed articles and on the
reliability of the technology, the judge ruled that this evidence did
not satisfy the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
standard, as it lacked verifiable proof of its scientific reliability.77
The judge further noted that error rates “in the ‘real-world’ or ‘real-
life’ setting” are currently unknown, enhancing the evidence’s
unreliability.78 However, the judge noted in his conclusion that he
could foresee a time in the future when this evidence could, in fact,
be admissible, “even if the error rate is not able to be quantified in
a real world setting.”79 The judge based this opinion on an assump-
tion that “fMRI-based lie detection [will eventually] undergo further
testing, development, and peer review, improve upon standards
controlling the technique’s operation, and gain acceptance by the
scientific community for use in the real world.”80
75. See Madrigal, Brain Scan, supra note 74; Madrigal, Brooklyn fMRI Case, supra note
74. 
76. Report and Recommendation on Motion to Exclude, United States v. Semrau, No. 07-
10074 Ml/p, 2010 WL 6845092, at *1, *7 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010).
77. Id. at *1, *10-13 (finding that despite several peer-reviewed publications and success
in the lab, the scientific community had yet to widely accept this evidence—a condition that
must be satisfied prior to courtroom admittance). Judge Pham excluded the evidence on the
basis of the following federal evidentiary standard for reliability prescribed in Daubert: 
(1) whether the theory or technique can be tested and has been tested; (2)
whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the method used and the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation;
and (4) whether the theory or method has been generally accepted by the
scientific community.
Id. at *9 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993)).
78. Id. at *11. An additional reason for the judge’s decision to exclude the evidence was
that Laken allowed the defendant to take the test three times, due to the defendant’s claim
that he was fatigued the first two times Laken administered the test. Id. at *6-7, *13. Judge
Pham noted that Laken “violated his own protocols” by retesting the defendant. Id. at *13.
Interestingly, the defendant failed the exam the first two times he took it, yet passed the third
time. Id.
79. Id. at *12 n.18.
80. Id. 
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The second attempt to admit fMRI evidence in court occurred in
May 2010, in a Brooklyn trial court.81 In that case, the court
ultimately decided to exclude the fMRI evidence that the plaintiff
attempted to admit to establish the veracity of a witness, because it
failed to meet the standard articulated in Frye v. United States,82
finding that “credibility is a matter solely for the jury and is clearly
within the ken of the jury.”83 The court held that this evidence failed
the Frye test because the evidence, submitted for lie-detection
purposes, removed the jury’s duty of assessing witness credibility.84 
Brain fingerprinting evidence, like fMRI scans, has not been
allowed in U.S. courts, with the exception of Harrington v. State.85
In Harrington, the judge admitted the evidence “only for his use in
considering a postconviction motion for relief, which was not held in
front of a jury. Hence, this ruling carries little precedential
weight.”86 Moreover, in Slaughter v. Oklahoma,87 Farwell, the
creator of brain fingerprinting, stated in an affidavit that he would
submit a report detailing the results of the test that he conducted,
but he ultimately failed to submit the report.88 The court found this
“strange, particularly in light of his willingness to testify in
Harrington.”89
In addition to basic evidentiary and reliability concerns, scholars
contend that the use of neuroscience in court also implicates consti-
tutional provisions—namely, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution.90 This science “poses new and untested ...
issues”91 to the Fifth Amendment’s assurance that “[n]o person shall
81. See Wilson v. Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
82. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
83. See Wilson, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
84. See id.; see also Madingal, Brooklyn fMRI Case, supra note 74 (citing Wilson, 900
N.Y.S.2d at 642) (noting that Judge Miller’s determination of the case was based on both the
lack of witness assessment of credibility as well as the plaintiff’s inability “to establish that
the use of the fMRI test to determine truthfulness or deceit is accepted as reliable within the
relevant scientific community”).
85. 659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003).
86. New, supra note 20, at 189 (citing Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 516). The Iowa Supreme
Court chose to ignore this evidence on appeal. Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 516. 
87. 105 P.3d 832 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
88. See New, supra note 20, at 190 (citing Slaughter, 105 P.3d at 834).
89. Id.
90. See id. at 193-98.
91. Id. at 193. 
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... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”92 Whether a violation exists under the Fifth Amendment in a
given case will hinge on whether courts find the science to be
“physical evidence or actual testimony by the individual.”93 
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment’s right “of the people to be
secure in their persons”94 and the guarantee of “privacy, dignity, and
security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by
officers of the government or those acting at their direction,”95 raise
important search and seizure questions regarding the legality of
obtaining this “mental information.”96 If courts find mental informa-
tion to be searchable and seizeable based upon the existence of
probable cause to suspect wrongdoing, some scholars argue that the
government could eventually mandate defendants to undergo fMRI
or brain fingerprinting testing.97
Although the evidentiary and constitutional concerns that this
evidence implicates are worthy of consideration, this Note’s analysis
is broader in its scope. Assuming neuroscience gains general
acceptance in the scientific community, that acceptance will likely
translate into legal approval and evidentiary admissibility.98
Moreover, once the threshold evidentiary issues are satisfied,
constitutional issues are not likely to pose a significant threat to
admissibility, particularly if courts find the “mental information” to
be physical evidence, along the lines of DNA or fingerprinting.99
Thus, an analysis limited to U.S. evidentiary and constitutional
protections, although beneficial, is too narrow a vantage point from
which to view such an expansive and looming scientific reality—a
reality that has the ability to impact the entire international
community. 
92. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
93. Id.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
95. New, supra note 20, at 195 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602,
613-14 (1989)). 
96. See id.
97. Id. at 193-98.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
99. See New, supra note 20, at 193-94.
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II. GROWING INTERNATIONAL CONCERN
As one scholar has aptly noted, “[t]he ethical issues that would
arise from a reliable (or thought-to-be-reliable) brain-imaging
deception technology are complex.”100 As such, although too myopic
in scope to serve as the sole basis of discussion in this Note, a
historical analysis of surface-level considerations that this science
implicates is helpful to contextualize some of the more prominent
issues at stake. Although an analysis of these complexities should
naturally begin with an overview of the superficial problems related
to admissibility, such considerations will differ dramatically among
countries depending upon their standards of admissibility.101
Additionally, surface-level considerations leave open some of the
deeper and more pressing questions of admissibility. For instance,
what, if any, rights are implicated by the admissibility of this
evidence, and what are the possible limits that courts should impose
on the breadth of this evidence? 
A. Predecessors of fMRI and Brain Fingerprinting
Albeit new and still developing, neurotechnology is a throwback
to a familiar predecessor—the polygraph—and its inherent prob-
lems.102 Though the majority of U.S. courts now hold the polygraph
to be inadmissible in criminal cases, largely due to its scientific
unreliability,103 proponents’ promises of more advanced neuro-lie-
100. Paul Root Wolpe et al., Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie-Detection: Promises and
Perils, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 39, 39.
101. India’s use of this evidence exemplifies this contention. See Giridharadas, supra note
3.
102. Wolpe et al., supra note 100, at 39 (“Using these technologies in courtrooms and for
security screening purposes ... raises many of the same difficult ethical and legal issues
already present in the debate over conventional polygraphy.”). Both polygraphy and
neurotechnology exhibit problems with accurate measurements and questionable reliability.
Id. at 41.
103. See New, supra note 20, at 179-80 (citing Charles M. Sevilla, Reliability of Polygraph
Examination, 14 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts §§ 1, 7-8 (1977)); see also Wolpe et al., supra note
100, at 41, 46. Polygraphy remains a popular tool despite issues with its scientific reliability,
evidencing people’s desire to have access to lie-detection devices. Id. at 45 (“Alternatives [to
the polygraph] are welcomed and implemented even though they suffer from the same, or
new, limitations.”).
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detection devices have attracted a steady stream of national and
international attention.104 Coupled with this increase in attention
are questions related to the breadth and scope of this technology’s
invasion into privacy, which many scholars contend is far greater
than the invasiveness of polygraphy.105 
Neurotechnology may ultimately mimic the polygraph’s eventual
devolution into inadmissibility. Or, as many legal scholars believe,
the more likely fate of fMRI and brain fingerprinting is to follow in
the footsteps of their more successful technological predecessors,
such as fingerprinting and DNA.106 These scholars contend that
neurotechnology and its potential uses will continue to expand with
more sophisticated knowledge, similar to the way in which “[g]enetic
information[,] ... inconsequential when originally stored in tissue
samples[,] [became] increasingly revealing” with greater knowledge
of genetics.107 
Analyzing this issue from a human rights perspective should,
therefore, begin with a glance backwards. Neuroscientific evidence
“evokes obvious, recognizable parallels to other sorts of physical
evidence that may be compelled from a suspect, such as finger-
prints, hair and blood samples, or genetic evidence in the form of
DNA.”108 Scholars have yet to determine whether information de-
rived from neuroscientific testing is actual physical evidence or is a
more amorphous, intangible type of evidence.109 But, as with ob-
taining DNA or fingerprint evidence, the question of compelling
104. See Wolpe et al., supra note 100, at 44 (describing the aggressive promotional
techniques on Farwell’s website, http://www.brainwavescience.com, on which Farwell is
shown standing “in a white lab coat, surrounded by testimonials from a U.S. Senator, media
clips, and praise of the technique for applications including forensic investigation,
counterterrorism efforts, early detection of Alzheimer’s disease, studies of efficiency of
advertising campaigns, and security testing”). The effectiveness of Farwell’s promotional tools
is evidenced by the fact that several countries and various U.S. organizations have bought
brain fingerprinting equipment, including the DaVinci Institute, “a Colorado ‘futurist think
tank’ [that purchased the technology in 2004] ... to train 1000 ‘brain fingerprinting’
technicians.” Id. 
105. Id. at 39-40, 45-47 (commenting that although neurotechnology and the polygraph
share similar problematic elements, this new technology poses its own set of unique
complexities, including the invasion of one’s cognitive liberty). 
106. New, supra note 20, at 193.
107. Wolpe et al., supra note 100, at 46.
108. New, supra note 20, at 193.
109. Id. at 193-95.
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neuroscientific evidence strikes to the heart of privacy issues and
other related human rights concerns. 
As previously mentioned, skeptics of this new technology have
coined the term “cognitive liberty” to denote the right that neurosci-
ence seems poised to invade.110 As a somewhat abstract principle,
cognitive liberty pertains to the privacy of one’s mental freedom and
consciousness of thought.111 Thus, from a privacy standpoint, anal-
ogizing brain activity to fingerprinting and DNA evidence creates a
significant problem. If brain activity becomes synonymous with
genetic information, or physical evidence, few barriers or protections
against eventual mandatory testing will remain.112 
The Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio enunciated the principle of
governmental invasion of a person’s privacy under the Fourth
Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause.113 According to Terry,
courts should analyze “the reasonableness in all the circumstances
of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal
security.”114 Moreover, in United States v. Knights, the Supreme
Court found that the reasonableness of a search—the degree of
intrusion into an individual’s privacy compared to the need “for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests”—depends on the
totality of the circumstances.115 In compliance with this standard,
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Kincade held that “[t]he
compulsory extraction of blood for DNA profiling unquestionably
implicates the right to personal security embodied in the Fourth
Amendment, and thus constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of
the Constitution.”116 
Finding DNA testing to be constitutionally permissible in most
instances, Congress has subjected more and more individuals to
mandatory testing.117 The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act
110. See Rosen, supra note 2; see also Wolpe et al., supra note 100, at 39.
111. See Wolpe et al., supra note 100, at 39-40; Rosen, supra note 2.
112. See New, supra note 20, at 193-95.
113. 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
114. Id.
115. 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 562 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
116. 379 F.3d 813, 821 n.15 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306
(4th Cir. 1992) (noting that the act of taking a blood sample to obtain DNA is tantamount to
“a search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment” (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989))).
117. See LISA M. SEGHETTI & NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32247, DNA
TESTING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT: LEGISLATIVE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 8 (2006).
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of 2000 mandated that DNA samples be obtained “from individuals
in custody and those on probation, parole, or supervised release
after being convicted of ‘qualifying Federal offenses.’”118 Shortly
thereafter, in 2004, the Justice for All Act extended DNA testing to
any felony, as opposed to “qualifying” felonies in the 2000 Act.119
Finally, the DNA Fingerprinting Act of 2005 applied to all “who are
arrested and detained.”120 Today, the U.S. Code provides that the
Attorney General may “collect DNA samples from individuals who
are arrested, facing charges, or convicted or from non-United
States persons who are detained under the authority of the United
States.”121 
Genetic identifiers have become normative and commonplace.122
Courts typically view procedures such as obtaining a blood sample
or a fingerprint as minimally physically invasive123 and pursuant
to the purpose of establishing identity.124 It remains to be seen,
however, whether courts will adopt a similar interpretation of
neurotechnology. 
The hype surrounding neurotechnology and its promises evokes
the long-standing allure of DNA evidence. DNA’s ability to assist in
crimesolving has led some to conclude that it is “the most significant
weapon in crime detection since the introduction of fingerprinting
in the early 1900s.”125 Whether neurotechnology is poised to become
this century’s new “weapon in crime”126 or merely unreliable junk
science is yet to be seen. Much will depend on how courts choose to
analyze the totality of the circumstances as they relate to the
118. United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 14135a
(2006)). 
119. Id.
120. See SEGHETTI & JAMES, supra note 117, at 8.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A).
122. See generally SEGHETTI & JAMES, supra note 117, at 1 (“By analyzing selected DNA
sequences ... a forensic laboratory can develop a profile to be used in identifying a person from
a DNA sample.”).
123. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989)).
124. Id. at 306 (“[W]hen a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his identification
becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim privacy in it.”); see also
42 U.S.C. § 14135e (noting that DNA is used for identification purposes and not to obtain
additional information about a person’s particular disposition or traits).
125. See SEGHETTI & JAMES, supra note 117, at 2.
126. Id.
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technology’s physical and mental invasiveness as compared to the
government’s interest in the sought-after mental information.127 
Unlike actual physical evidence such as DNA and fingerprints,
however, neural activity–and anything in the cognitive realm for
that matter–deals with layers of conscious and subconscious
complexities.128 Moreover, if the legal system were to mandate this
testing, it would cast doubt on the common understanding of what
it means to communicate: “without the mental intent to communi-
cate, there can be no communicative behavior.”129 But as scholars
have recognized, the choice and intent to communicate are neurolog-
ical decisions, and would be entirely eradicated if a person were
forced to subject himself to neurological assessment, essentially
rendering it the equivalent of a compelled testimony.130 
B. Neuroscience Conferences Galore 
Lurking in the background of questions related to the reliability
and eventual admissibility of neuroscience in the courtroom are
moral and ethical concerns about the scope of what this evidence
will be used to prove. Equally pressing is the extent to which
cognitive liberty will be invaded to ascertain intangibles like a
guilty mind and possibly criminal thoughts. 
In the wake of the Indian court’s 2008 decision to admit neuro-
scientific evidence in the now infamous murder trial of Aditi
Sharma,131 the international community began to take note of both
the possibilities and limitations of this new technology. Groups
recently gathered in Milan, Italy, to discuss the impact of neurosci-
ence on both American and European law during a conference
127. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (noting that the
reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment depends upon weighing the degree
of intrusion on a person’s privacy against the need to promote “legitimate governmental
interests” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))).
128. New, supra note 20, at 194 (“Fingerprints, blood alcohol levels, genetic information,
and other forms of physical evidence are not under conscious control; they exist independent
of nervous system activity and can even be preserved after death, when all neural activity
ceases. Not so with memories or other manifestations of neural activity (such as emotions or
intents), the expression of which is under nervous system control and is of the same
neurological nature.”). 
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
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entitled “Neuroscience in European and North-American Case-Law
and Judicial Practice.”132 The conference’s call for abstracts recog-
nized that 
[t]he greatest enthusiasm [for neuroscience] has been in the
United States, where a worldwide debated case law has devel-
oped. Throughout Europe there is now the necessity, on one side,
to understand whether there is a unknown use of such
neuroscientific techniques and, on the other side, to train judges
and legal practitioners to properly understand and use these
new methods.133 
The Milan conference is one of many that have taken place through-
out the world over the past few years, indicating that this issue is
one of international scope and concern.134 The growing international
attention to neurotechnology underscores the extent to which
human rights are implicated in the expansion of this science. 
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
After Sharma’s conviction, her attorney, Revati Dere, disparaged
the use of brain scans employed to convict her client, noting that
“[s]omewhere, someone down the line should understand it’s the
human mind that you’re talking about. It can’t be tested with that
much accuracy. It’s an easy solution, a very easy solution. A short
cut.”135 Dere’s opinion, although not scientifically based, expresses
a very real concern: the human mind and its contents might be too
complex to lead to predictive and certain scientific results that
courts of law should rely upon. In contrast, Champadi Raman
Mukundan, the creator of India’s version of the brain fingerprinting
scan, believes that “[m]an is not destined to be controlled by nature.
132. US and Europe on the Stand — Are Legal Systems Neuroscience Friendly?, ITALIAN
SCIENTIST & SCHOLARS IN N. AM. FOUND., http://www.issnaf.org/events/us-and-europe-on-the-
stand-are-legal-systems-neuroscience-friendly.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
133. Call for Abstracts, European Centre for Life Scis., Health, and the Courts, Univ. of
Pavia, available at http://kolber.typepad.com/files/callforabstracts_italy.pdf.
134. Fukushi et al., supra note 24, at 11 (recognizing that Canada and several European
nations have begun to fund neuroscience research, hold conferences to discuss the
implications for society, and take note of potential ethical and legal concerns). 
135. Saini, supra note 3.
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Man is destined to control nature .... Human beings are destined to
create a nature and then live in that nature.”136 The inherent ten-
sion between these diverging viewpoints is at the core of the
dispute.
Although the legal community will eventually validate either
Dere’s or Mukundan’s view to the exclusion of the other, prior to
this ultimate validation, it is important to analyze the potential
human rights issues implicated by this evidence—particularly if its
use is mandated. 
A. Bioethics and Neuroethics on the Same Continuum
Neuroethics, a recently modernized field at the intersection of
bioethics and neuroscience, “is founded on centuries of discussion of
the ethical issues associated with mind and behavior.”137 As a
separate field of inquiry apart from bioethics, neuroethics relates to
the “ethical, legal and social policy implications of neuroscience, and
with aspects of neuroscience research itself,” including advances in
neuroscientific technology.138 In contrast, bioethics pertains to the
ethical considerations inherent in the expansion of biological sci-
ences, with a particular focus on respecting individuals’ privacies.139
To ensure proper protection of individuals in light of rapid
scientific expansion, the International Brain Research Organization
(IBRO) was created in 1960 and is currently overseen by
UNESCO.140 Additionally, in 2001, President George W. Bush
created the President’s Council on Bioethics, whose purpose was “to
discuss emerging ethical issues related to recent developments in
biomedical science and technology, such as human cloning, aging,
and stem cell research.”141 Out of these efforts came the Universal
136. Id.
137. See Bird & Illes, supra note 20, at 511.
138. Id. (“With more and more studies touching upon personal and societal phenomena,
neuroethics and the terrain it covers are continuously expanding.”).
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 512. 
141. Fukushi et al., supra note 24, at 10. The purpose of the Executive Order establishing
the Commission was to continuously advise the President on “bioethical issues” resulting from
technological, scientific advances. Executive Order Establishing the Presidential Commission
for the Study of Bioethical Issues, Exec. Order No. 13,521, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,671, 62,671 (Nov.
24, 2009).
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Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights, adopted by UNESCO
in 2005.142 The Bioethics Declaration aims to “provide a universal
framework of principles and procedures to guide States in the
formulation of their legislation, policies or other instruments in the
field of bioethics,”143 all while “promot[ing] respect for human
dignity and protect[ing] human rights, by ensuring respect for the
life of human beings, and fundamental freedoms, consistent with
international human rights law.”144 In sum, the Bioethics Declara-
tion encourages freedom in scientific research and development
while simultaneously ensuring that the expansion of bioethics
remains within ethical bounds.145 
As a subsidiary of bioethics, neuroscience and its nascent lie- and
memory-detection technology should fall under the auspices of the
Bioethics Declaration and conform to its aims and guidelines.
Although the Society for Neuroscience (SfN) oversees some of the
social and policy implications of neuroscience research,146 it is not as
overarching or extensive as that of the IBRO under UNESCO.147
Moreover, unlike bioethical considerations, no declaration of human
rights pertaining specifically to neuroscience currently exists.148
UNESCO, however, created the Bioethics Declaration as a means
to attempt to preserve basic human rights in light of general scien-
tific advances.149 
142. UNESCO General Conference Res. 15, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human
Rights 33d Sess., Oct. 3-21, 2005 [hereinafter Bioethics Declaration], available at http://
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001428/142825e.pdf. 
143. Id. art. 2(a).
144. Id. art. 2(c).
145. Id. art. 2(d).
146. Bird & Illes, supra note 20, at 512 (noting that the Society came into existence in
1969). The SfN has grown from 500 members in its early years to an impressive 40,000,
serving as the “world's largest organization of scientists and physicians devoted to advancing
understanding of the brain and nervous system.” About Membership, SOC’Y FOR
NEUROSCIENCE, http://www.sfn.org/index.aspx?pagename=membership_AboutMembership
(last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
147. In 1972, the SfN created a separate Social Issues Committee to monitor some of these
concerns, but the Committee has since disbanded and the aims of the Committee have become
subsumed into the general principles of awareness that the SfN seeks to achieve. See Bird &
Illes, supra note 20, at 512. And, although the SfN works to coordinate with other
organizations such as the IBRO, its primary focus is the advancement of scientific
development and education, not human rights. See sources cited supra note 146.
148. Farrell, supra note 4, at 93 (“There are no express provisions in the major
international human rights instruments regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence.”). 
149. See Bioethics Declaration, supra note 142.
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Although the Bioethics Declaration alone might not provide much
in the way of substantive guidance on how to oversee and poten-
tially limit the use of neuroscience in the courtroom, the Declaration
clearly provides a starting point and guidelines for how countries
should react to new scientific advances in this field. And when read
in conjunction with other human rights instruments, a clearer
picture of the protectable rights and interests begins to emerge.
B. Right to a Fair Trial 
The right to a fair trial is an enumerated right within both the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)150 and the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).151 According to the
UDHR, “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determi-
nation of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge
against him.”152 The ECHR similarly states that in a criminal trial,
“everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reason-
able time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law.”153 
Lack of scientific validity is one basis upon which to claim the
need for international human rights protection. If courts choose to
admit neuroscientific evidence prior to establishing its reliability,
they will violate a person’s right to an independent and impartial
150. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at
71, art. 10 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. Although not a treaty itself, the UDHR seeks
to maintain 
a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end
that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for
these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance,
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of
territories under their jurisdiction.
Id. at pmbl. As of early 2012, the United Nations had a total of 193 Member States. UN at a
Glance, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 7,
2012).
151. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter ECHR].
152. UDHR, supra note 150, art. 10.
153. ECHR, supra note 151, art. 6(1).
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trial.154 Admitting inadequately reliable evidence contravenes the
express human rights provision of a right to a fair trial.155 As Brian
Farrell has noted, however, “as advances in neurotechnology, sup-
ported by peer-reviewed research, enhance the reliability of the
brain scan as a method of showing experiential knowledge,” this
argument will likely become moot and courts will admit this
evidence without further contestation.156 
A secondary argument, and one that persists notwithstanding
issues of scientific reliability, is that neuroscientific evidence will
have such a dramatic effect on juries and judges that it will impair
a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Even if proven to be scientifically
reliable, images—and neuroimages in particular—can have a more
profound effect on jury determinations than verbal testimony.157 The
President’s Council on Bioethics referenced this phenomenon in a
staff working paper, wherein it noted that “[j]urors can be dazzled
by the display.”158 The implications of showing a jury a live brain
scan, with illuminated regions of the brain indicating memory,
emotion, or truth-telling, are vast. Such images would far exceed the
impact that crime scene photographs or victim impact videos have
on juries as these images promise a new and ambitious understand-
ing of the human mind. Therefore, the right to a fair and impartial
trial included in the provisions of both the UDHR and the ECHR
faces a dual threat from the lack of scientific reliability and the
impact that neuroscientific evidence is likely to have on juries re-
gardless of its accuracy. 
154. See Farrell, supra note 4, at 93.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. See Annas, supra note 27, at 168 (noting the “power of the neuroimages themselves
to shape our perception of reality”); Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with
Great Skill”: How Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?,
42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 891-92 (2009) (recognizing that neuroimages, like holograms, are so
visually seductive they will likely become “inappropriately persuasive”). Some scholars believe
that brain images should be admitted into evidence only for the purpose of linking a
structural abnormality to a specific deficit and that functional brain images should not be
admitted for the purpose of establishing responsibility for, motivation for, or propensity to
commit a particular behavior, or to show an inability to control a particular behavior.
Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 15, at 171-72 (“Indeed, given the current state of medical
and scientific knowledge about the brain, once admitted as evidence, the courtroom is an
inadequate forum for determining the ‘truth’ of such evidence.”). 
158. Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 15, at 185 (citing Neuroscience Evidence, supra note
66, at 12).
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C. Cognitive Liberty: An Extension of a Privacy Right
Even more pertinent than a right to a fair trial are rights related
to privacy and security in one’s person—a bundle of rights, which,
unfortunately, might be entirely eradicated by brain scan technol-
ogy. At a minimum, if this technology gains widespread general
acceptance in the scientific community, it will inevitably invade a
right to privacy.159 Although estimating the extent of any invasion
is currently speculative, whatever cognitive liberties people do in
fact possess will cease to exist—especially if the refined testing
becomes mandatory. 
The type of information that this technology can expose is equally
problematic. Scientists believe, for example, that neurotechnology
has the ability to reveal information about “personality traits, men-
tal illness, sexual preferences or predisposition to drug addiction.”160
Searching for one piece of information could, therefore, lead to an
improper discovery of other, irrelevant, and deeply private infor-
mation. Failure to obtain consent prior to these various searches
could lead to severe consequences for the individual.161 
Also implicit within this argument are self-incrimination con-
cerns.162 Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR) protect against coerced self-incrimination.163 Additionally,
the European Court of Human Rights draws a distinction between
compelling “‘real’ evidence which has an ‘existence independent of
the will of the suspect’”—such as DNA, blood, and fingerprints—and
evidence such as thought processes, which are “not truly independ-
ent of the will of the suspect.”164 The question, then, becomes
whether thoughts and memories are “real” evidence that can be
compelled or whether they require the “will of the suspect.” If found
159. See Wolpe et al., supra note 100, at 39, 46.
160. Id. at 46.
161. Id. (noting that the discovery of this information “could lead to unanticipated
insurance, employment, or legal problems for the individual being tested”). 
162. See Farrell, supra note 4, at 93.
163. Id. (citing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(2)(g), Mar. 23,
1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; American Convention on Human Rights art.
8(2)(7), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143).
164. Id. at 94 (citing Jalloh v. Germany, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 667 (2006)).
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to be real evidence, this evidence will pose a very serious threat to
the right against self-incrimination. 
The threat against violating one’s right against self-incrimination
is part-in-parcel of a larger concern—one that may or may not exist
and is difficult to imagine because of the newness of the threat. The
concern, simply put, is that “the successful development of brain
scans as lie detection tools would invade ‘a last inviolate area of
self.’”165 
The importance of maintaining areas of self is reflected in the fact
that privacy is an internationally recognized, fundamental human
right. Another, somewhat tenuously related fundamental right is
freedom of thought.166 Article 18 of the UDHR states the following:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief,
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public
or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance.”167 This freedom is typically associated
with the right to develop one’s own opinions and beliefs independent
of others. In a related provision, Article 19 protects the right to
express one’s freedom of opinion without interference.168 Article 18,
therefore, protects the right to have freedom of thought whereas
Article 19 protects the right to express those thoughts. Nothing in
the Declaration, however, provides any express protection for the
gap that exists between having a thought and expressing it. The
ultimate question thus becomes whether people own their thoughts,
memories, and conscious realities, such that any compelled taking
amounts to a violation of what is the ultimate right to privacy.
Moreover, Articles 3 and 12 of the UDHR speak to the issue of
privacy as a human right.169 Article 3 guarantees that “[e]veryone
has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”170 Article 12
states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with
165. Id. at 95 (citing Henry T. Greely, The Social Effects of Advances in Neuroscience: Legal
Problems, Legal Perspectives, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE
AND POLICY 245 (Judy Illes ed., 2005)). 
166. See UDHR, supra note 150, art. 18.
167. Id. 
168. Id. art. 19.
169. Id. arts. 3 & 12.
170. Id. art. 3 (emphasis added). 
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his privacy.”171 Though a court might interpret a mandatory,
invasive test seeking to obtain and expose one’s thoughts and
memories as both a violation of security of person and interference
with privacy, a court could plausibly reach just the opposite con-
clusion. If courts determine that the evidence sought is in fact
physical evidence, they will likely not see neurotechnology as
violating one’s security of person, nor would they find an arbitrary
interference if probable cause existed to necessitate the taking.172
Much, therefore, will depend upon how courts or lawmakers
choose to characterize this evidence and frame the rights at issue.
As the rights currently exist, a compelled neurological exam might
arguably pose a threat to either security in one’s person or consti-
tute an arbitrary interference with one’s privacy. Part of the diffi-
culty in determining whether mandated testing would amount to a
human rights violation is that the technology and what it seeks to
expose do not squarely fit into any currently recognizable rights as
courts and citizens have come to understand them. However, due to
the rapidity of the advances in this field and the potential harm that
is likely to result if courts allow neuroscientific evidence into the
courtroom, it is at least necessary to analyze the potential human
rights at stake and ways to achieve a balance. 
CONCLUSION 
Arthur C. Clarke, a physicist and science fiction author, once
wrote that “any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguish-
able from magic.”173 This intriguing statement embodies the concern
that this Note explores. There is an obvious appeal in and fascina-
tion with technology that has the ability to expose the substance
and workings of someone’s thoughts—particularly those thoughts
that have the potential to establish a guilty mind. The resulting
evidence, however, should not be sought at all costs. 
Acknowledging that the ultimate questions regarding how this
evidence might come to invade one’s right to privacy remain
unanswered, it is nonetheless crucial to tread carefully prior to
171. Id. art. 12.
172. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text. 
173. ARTHUR C. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LIMITS OF THE
POSSIBLE 36 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1984) (1962). 
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admitting this evidence, with an understanding that its scope will
likely have to be limited either by fitting the right into an existing
framework or by creating a new right that delineates its scope. 
This Note, therefore, suggests that although the legality of
neuroscientific evidence should be viewed with an eye toward a
country’s specific laws, such an analysis does not, nor should it,
preclude a more all-inclusive analysis from a human rights perspec-
tive. Assuming that proponents of this technology are correct in
believing that it has the ability to revolutionize the legal field, a
limited analysis commits a disservice to the rights at stake.
Ultimately, although intriguing and possibly even beneficial to
improving the ways in which individuals understand the human
mind, neuroscience should be viewed as just that—science, not
magic.
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